Pro-active message's DTN are based on the usage of mobile code to obtain messages that contain their own routing code.
INTRODUCTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) have a set of unique characteristics that make it very difficult to find a routing protocol that can be applied successfully in any situation. Some of them are the non-contemporary of communications, the existence of significant delays and mobility patterns that allow nodes to be isolated from their neighbours during variable lapses of time. Due to that, there is not a de facto routing standard broadly extended and used. This makes DTN routing a challenge.
In an environment where the topology of the network changes very quickly and the nature and characteristics of the applications that use it are very different, the one-fit-all solution could be a chimera. Flexibility is a key aspect, and the only proposal that tries to obtain it, Haggle [1] , uses a dynamic approach with many pros and one important contra: the utilisation of an array of routings algorithms makes the deployment very hard and costly in any scenario where the set of applications grows, or simply changes, over time.
In response to that, we propose a model in which mobile code is used to obtain messages that contain its own routing code. This way we can offer applications the opportunity to differentiate themselves from one another and use the same network of different, specific, forms. From now on, there will be no need to treat different messages the same way.
. Using a routing code carried by the messages to provide a blind routing where all applications dispose of the same, or no, information to make decisions would not be useful. It is necessary to let the applications use their own information in order to achieve the desired flexibility. This information should be application-oriented and designed to allow messages to decide the best route based on the specific criteria of each application.
Without the appropriate security model, this whole model is unusable. We cannot rely on a network if any malicious message could access, delete or modify all the information stored in nodes, thereby disturbing the proper operation of one or more applications. If the information used during routing becomes poisoned, then the whole architecture will loose all its purpose. Therefore, it is crucial to dispose of a system that secures the information and prevents possible damaging attacks occurring, a system that makes feasible this new approach.
The obvious solution for this problem is called access control. However, almost all access control proposals are thought to protect resources as an abstract term. This approach is general and can be used in many scenarios, with many different objectives, but the drawback of that generalization is that it restricts the tools that can be used to protect resources. For example, access control can be used to protect a file, the usage of a printer or the usage of the network, but we cannot cypher a printer or sign the usage of the network. Besides, access control systems usually rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [2] , a requirement that cannot be met in a Delay Tolerant Network.
Therefore, an access control system that would grant only messages authorized by the application access to the information owned by that application is required. This system has to take into account:
• The system has to be capable of operating in a DTN environment, considering all of its unique characteristics.
• Every application must decide exactly the messages that are authorized to access to the information it manages. All other messages' access to this information must be prohibited.
• The system has to grant access to authorized messages fast enough to not diminish their routing opportunities.
We propose Identity based Access Control for Proactive Message's system, a secure access control system for messages with routing code focused on protecting a particular resource: structured and organized information used by messages during routing. In our model, each application is an abstract entity that can use a set of different mobile codes to route messages to its destination.
These codes usually work together with a common objective. The network provides distributed applicationrelated information used by the mobile codes in order to communicate between them, gather context-aware data or use it during routing, store intermediate results or receive instructions or parameters provided by the application.
Our proposal brings feasibility to the whole network architecture by granting confidentiality and integrity of information. In order to achieve this, we implement access control using two different hash functions and symmetric key encryption when a mobile code requests access information. The hash functions are applied to the code itself and are used to recover the cryptographic key needed to decrypt the information.
Structure of this paper
The following sections of this paper are structured this 
PRO-ACTIVE MESSAGES, A PARADIGM'S SHIFT
In this section, we will explain the environment in which our research has been undertaken. We will explain first Delay Tolerant Networks, and how the traditional approach deals with the challenges they present. Then we will focus on Pro-active messages as our central concept of a new Delay Tolerant Networks paradigm and we will study the utility of providing application related information to be used during routing. Finally, we will explain the three phases of operation of Pro-active message's based DTN.
Delay Tolerant Networks
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) [3] are networks where the low connectivity rates, the high and variable delays, and the impossibility to establish simultaneous end-toend paths make communications very challenging. Delay Tolerant Networking is usually used in regions where the communication networks are unavailable or spotty, where the lack of a fixed infrastructure and the mobility of the nodes of the network allow them to be isolated from their neighbours during variable lapses of time.
The cornerstone of DTN is the store-carry-and-forward strategy [4] , which is a way for turning a weakness as the mobility of the nodes into a strength. Using this strategy, nodes store and carry their messages until they opportunistically establish contacts with other nodes of the network, and they make use of these unpredictable contacts to forward the messages. This process is repeated until the messages eventually reach their destination. The simultaneous end-to-end paths that cannot be established are somehow substituted by a mix between physical distances travelled by nodes carrying messages and nodeto-node transmissions when other nodes are contacted.
DTN routing protocols focus on the decision making when two or more nodes establish contact. What messages should be forwarded? How many copies of every message should be created? Is there a message not worth sending?
What messages should be dropped last? etc. . . These questions are addressed by routing protocols, who try to ask these questions to maximize the performance of the network.
The traditional DTN approach consists in selecting a routing protocol and deploying it in every node of the network. This way all nodes behave the same way in terms of routing, and most important, all messages are treated equally all over the network.
Pro-active message based DTN
Our proposal revolves around the concept of changing the traditional approach to routing. Instead of using routing algorithms deployed in every node of the network, we move the routing code from the nodes to the messages, using mobile code as is suggested in [5, 6] . In this paradigm, nodes provide the necessary infrastructure to let the messages decide the way towards its destination, but the own message carries the routing algorithm that decides how to route it. The type of DTN where this research forwardTo ⊆ neighbourList
Application driven routing
The most important advantage of Pro-active message's DTN approach is that applications themselves can use the network any way they want. It is important to note that every application knows its own needs better than any other, and similarly, the best routing decision for an application can be different to the best routing decision for another application and nobody but the applications themselves can know that. Consequently, by using Proactive messages, applications can take their own optimal routing decisions.
Very different applications can coexist inside the same network. However, Pro-active messages cannot take optimal decisions without having enough information. In this model, the usage of an application-related information is crucial. Routing cannot be driven by applications unless they can decide everything about the information they want to use. The way to achieve this is to let the applications use ontologies to structure their information. Then, the same information is seen simultaneously in two very different ways: while the network sees it as a stream of bytes the applications see it as a structured knowledge. In our proposal of Pro-active message's based DTN, this routing information is stored in nodes in the Routing Information route. Pro-active messages must also be able to modify the information, updating its value in a way that can be known or understood by the application itself.
Operation of the network
During the operation of the Pro-active message's based DTN, we can differentiate between three phases, depending on the type of the messages sent and the actions performed by the users, the applications and the administrators of the network. Figure 2 shows the flow chart of the three phases mentioned above, the deployment phase is the initial phase of the network, followed by the standard and update phases which form an endless cycle.
STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we introduce the concept of mobile code related with access control. Following, we present some of the most representative research community's solutions for access control for mobile code and analyse their characteristics. We focus especially on those characteristics that can become problematic in a DTN.
Access Control for Mobile Code
Mobile code [7] is code sourced from remote, possibly unknown or untrusted systems or networks, but executed locally In the following paragraphs, we provide an overview of some of the ideas and proposals from the research community currently used to solve the access control for mobile code problem.
Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based policies [9] , also referred to as role-based security, is the most extended and used approach in medium and large organizations [10] . Role-based policies regulate users' access to the information depending on the activities they carry out in the system. Roles are defined on the basis of the actions associated with a concrete working activity. Then, instead of giving authorizations to each user every time they want to access a resource, users are given authorization to adopt roles. Finally, each requested access is allowed or denied depending on the roles adopted by the user, Figure 3 illustrates this process. It is important to note that Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is designed to be used inside a closed system.
Using it in a DTN is problematic because the access control module needs a fair role assignment. This is hard to achieve if we have to separate the access control module and the role assignment module into different nodes that could become unlinked them during the access control process. As a result, although RBAC does not use any cryptographic tool, it can not be used in a DTN schema without using cryptography to secure transmissions.
Access Control based on trust
Cryptographic tools such as digital signature [11] are used by software authors to sign the code which is distributed together with the author's digital certificate and signature.
When the code arrives a host and is about to be executed, the signature is validated, and then the system grants the code access to all requested resources exclusively in the case that the author of the code is trustworthy.
There are lots of proposals designed to enhance this trust model. These proposals are based on the assumption that it is impossible for a user to know all the world's trustworthy software developers and trust their programs.
Trust management [12] tries to establish trust relationships between users and developers that do not know each other.
The key point is not to try to establish the authorship of the code but establish the credentials of the code instead [13] . An example of Access Control based on trust is KeyNote Trust Management System [14] , where users delegate into trusted credential issuers that are expected to have direct or indirect relationships with potential requesters. Other proposals [15] have dynamically updated trust relationships as more information is collected from code execution or use recommendations from peers to calculate the scale of the trust on the unknown requester [16] . 
Security-by-contract
Security-by-contract [17] goes a step further and uses digital signature to link together the code, not only with the author but also with a contract [18] that specifies the actions the code will perform during its execution. This model also relies on trusting the code author, but the idea is that only permissions that are needed are granted, or at least, permissions that the author considers necessary for the code (open and write a file, create a socket, access a database, send packets to a specific domain, etc. . . ).
Thanks to security-by-contract, users are able to know exactly not only who wrote a program, but also what actions will be executed if the contract is accepted.
Of course, security-by-contract needs to use cryptography to bind the code to a contract in order to guarantee the authenticity and the origin of the contract. Otherwise, a malicious entity could write its own contract and use it to gain access to a resource from unauthorized code.
Additionally, if an application decides to delete or revoke the permissions given to a code to access some information, it can not be done with this system. When a contract is attached to a signed code, there is no way to revoke or change it unless the certificate used to sign the contract is revoked.
History-based access control
History-based access control for mobile code, such as Deeds [19] , gather and store information about the actions executed and the resources accessed by the mobile code.
Subsequently, this historical information is used to link the process to several pre-defined profiles (editor, browser, terminal, etc. . . ). Finally, those profiles are used to decide about the requests made processes (e.g. a program opens a local file is labelled as "editor", but when the same program tries to open a socket, the creation of the socket is not allowed because it is an action allowed for "browsers" but not for "editors").
This approach is extremely specific to control the execution of code downloaded from an unknown source towards Internet, or another similar environment, and it is hardly applicable to other situations. History-based Access Control does not match with the requirements of the environment. This proposal is designed to work in scenarios where the resources are very different and the only danger occurs when two or more are used together, or one after another. In Pro-active message's DTN, the only action performed by codes usually is access information, and a "safe" or "dangerous" behaviour does not exist (based on the information accessed by the code).
Common characteristics
It is important to note that most of the access control Another important aspect to consider is that security is, in almost most cases, cryptographically based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a very extended model that fits well with Internet's characteristics but not with DTN characteristics. The access to a trusted third party, to the certificate's repository or to revocation lists cannot be available in a DTN, additionally, the distribution of the certificates among nodes remains unsolved [20, 3, 21, 22, 23] . The reason for this is that PKI is based on assumptions such as permanent point-to-point connectivity or the small delays at the link layer that cannot be applied in DTN.
IDENTITY OF PRO-ACTIVE

MESSAGES
In this section, we will see the specific necessities of the Pro-active messages identification's process and the need of that identification in order to provide access control to a given information. Then, we will discuss different ways of message authentication, and we will study the pros and cons of our solution.
Identification of Pro-active messages
Supposing that a message arrives a node and requests access to the information of the application A. It is necessary to identify and authenticate that message in order to decide if it is authorized to access the information about this application.
Since the data field can contain any value, the quantity of different Pro-active messages that an application can create is infinite. However, during routing, the data field is meaningless, it does not play any role until the message is delivered to its destination.
We have to consider a hypothetical attacker that alters a Pro-active message modifying its routing code that tries to, using a forged routing code, access or modify A's information. This is one of the points we want to fight in our research, to develop an access control system that fits with this situation.
Authentication of Pro-active messages
In general, the authentication process can be seen from four different perspectives.
1. To find out something anything that nobody else can know, for example, a password.
2. To find out something that nobody else has, for example, a key.
3. To find out how to do something in a particular way, for example, a signature.
4.
To have a unique characteristic, for example, a fingerprint or a DNA chain.
Here we will examine why the first three approaches are not valid when considering the authentication problem of the Pro-active messages in a DTN environment. The first two points can be analysed together. A software entity cannot differentiate between having something and knowing something. A message cannot travel with physical elements as a key or a card, but it can travel with any data, as a password or a digital key. The usage of portable passwords has an important drawback: the theft of a password compromises immediately the whole system, because from that moment, the attacker could use send a malicious message with the stolen password to access a protected information from its routing code.
The third approach makes us think directly about the usage of a well-known cryptographic technique: digital signature. However, digital signature leans in the PKI, a schema that can't be applied in DTN, as we have seen in Section 3.
We find the solution to our problem in the fourth point, above. When a routing code tries to access an entry, we can determine if it is authorized by analysing it. In that case we are using something that it is inherent to the code, something that cannot be copied or stolen because it forms part of what that routing code is. This is an idea previously pointed out in [24] to manage package distributions of software.
Using a simile with conventional identity based access control system, we can say that we analyse the DNA of the message in order to identify and authenticate it, the routing code of the message, like the DNA of a living being. This way, the message does not need to know or have or do anything, it will be authenticated for what it is.
Identify code using hash
Messages can use routing codes of different lengths. In order to use routing code to decide about access control, it is preferable to manage a fixed-size element. With just a hash function applied on the routing code, it is possible to obtain a binary sequence that identifies it and, at the same time, differentiates it from any other.
Our system uses the hash of the routing code to identify messages. This way, if a message is intercepted, the only way a hypothetical attacker could use the obtained data to access information is to create a message with the obtained routing code. Regardless, a behaviour like this would not compromise the security of the system. Note that if the routing code of the new message is exactly the same of the original message then it would not cause any malicious action over the stored information.
IDENTITY BASED ACCESS CONTROL
In this section, we will analyse the requisites that our access control system has to satisfy. Secondly, we will present the Authorized Hashes Set, the Entries Set and the algorithms used to add content to these sets. Thirdly, we will explain the way of using these sets and the algorithms to achieve an effective access control system. Finally, we will explain the characteristics of Identity based Access Control. 
Notation
For the sake of clarity, we provide Table I, which contains the notation used to refer to each one of the different elements that will appear in this and the next Section, and a brief description of its meaning. From now on, we will use this notation.
Notation Meaning
i Identifies a message.
ci Routing code of message i. c i Routing code forged to replace ci.
j Identifies an application.
Ij
Information of application j stored in the RIDB. 
Requirements
The developed system uses the hash value of ci from each Pro-active message in order to identify it and provide control access to the protected Information Ij, which is stored at the custodian. The following requisites need to be granted:
• The system should grant access to all authorized ci to information Ij.
• The system should grant secrecy and integrity to all protected Information Ij. No unauthorized ci (or other processes) should be able to access or modify it.
• The system should allow nodes to send entries between them to spread among the nodes of the network the updates made by the applications.
• The system should add a minimum impact in terms of resource's consumption and execution time. This is necessary to avoid conflicts with small connectivity windows, typical in DTN scenarios.
A system based on two sets
To decide if ci is authorized to access Ij, our proposal is based in the usage of two sets, the set of entries and the set of stored information.
Authorized Hashes Set
The Authorized Hashes Set (AHS) is the key element of our proposal, and it is the only set that has to be deployed into nodes during the deployment phase. AHS contains a collection of triplets as explained next:
Where: • j identifies the application to which the Information Ij belongs, is used to identify the triplet together with the result of applying a hash algorithm to ci.
• kj is the symmetric key needed to cipher and decrypt the protected information Ij, and it is cyphered with E using the result of another hash algorithm over ci as key.
Entries Set
The Entries Set (ES) is a collection of pairs as follows:
Where:
• j identifies the application to which the Information Ij and allows us to make a quick search of a stored entry identified by j without trying to decrypt every entry in the set.
• Ij is the protected information, ciphered using a symmetric encryption algorithm using a key kj that is stored in the AHS (see following subsections 5.4
and 5.5 in order to know how the key kj is obtained and stored).
Creation of the AHS
When new information Ij has to be stored and protected in one or more nodes, Algorithm 1 is used to add to the AHS and ES sets the needed triplets and pairs.
Algorithm 1 Storage of protected information
Input: Ij: Information to be protected.
j: Identifier of the information.
M : Set of messages i with access to Ij.
Output: ∅ 1: Generate a random key kj.
2: Cypher E k j (Ij).
3: Ad to ES the pair (j, E k j (Ij)). Obtain routing code ci.
6:
Calculate h(ci) and h (ci).
7:
Cypher E h(c i ) (kj).
8:
Add (j, h (ci), E h(c i ) (kj)) to AHS.
9: end for 10: return ∅
Using the set of entries to control access to an entry
When a message i arrives to a node and its routing code ci requests access the Information of application j, Algorithm 2 has to be applied. This algorithm recovers the keys needed to decrypt that information only if ci is authorized to access Ij.
Modification of a protected entry
Algorithm 3 is used when a message i, previously authorized to access Ij, modifies it and decides to overwrite Ij with the newer version I j . j: Identifier of the information.
Output: Ij: Information requested, identified by j.
1: Obtain ci from message i. Output: true or false.
1: Execute first 9 lines of algorithm 2.
2: if Ij has been successfully decrypted then 3:
Cypher E k j (I j ).
4:
Remove the pair (j, E k j (Ij)) from ES.
5:
Add the pair (j, E k j (I j )) to ES. Algorithm 2) are kept in the memory for a while. This way we can avoid executing repeatedly the same operations.
Characteristics of Identity based Access
Control system
Identity based Access Control system uses two different hash functions, the output of one of them is used to identify the subject, and the output of the other is used to cypher and decrypt the key needed to access the information.
Our proposal uses a discretionary policy, and it is designed loosely following the guidelines of an access control list (see Figure 4 ). This approach consists on associating each system's object with all the authorized subjects that can access it and the actions they can perform over the object. Subsequently, the list is consulted when a Instead of relating the name of every subject with its permissions in order to allow or deny access to information, our system relates the identifier of each subject (the result of a hash function) to the key needed to decrypt the information (see Figure 5 ). This key can be retrieved only by the proper subject (because it is encrypted with the result of another hash function is key). Moreover, the identifier of each piece of information is related with the encrypted information itself, therefore, the information can't be decrypted and accessed without getting the key.
Using the Identity based Access Control instead of simply an Access Control List system has two advantages:
it provides security against a certain type of situations that we need to avoid, such as a remote attack using routing code forgery, and it allows nodes to spread updates of routing information securely (see Section 6 for more details).
Access Control in Pro-active message's DTN
We encourage the reader to look at Table II , which provides a qualitative comparison between our proposal and other access control systems. 
SECURITY OF THE ACCESS CONTROL
In this section, we will discuss security offered by our identity based access control system. With this in mind, we will analyse three different scenarios. In the first scenario, an attacker tries to create a malicious Pro-active message that could access a protected information. In the second scenario, an attacker intercepts an exchange of routing information between nodes and tries to access these entries. In the last scenario, an attacker that has compromised a node tries to access all entries, using the sets AHS and ES. Finally, we provide some conclusions about the three scenarios.
Security against routing code forgery
A remote attacker that wants to compromise the entry Ij needs to make a Pro-active message i with a routing code c i that is passed as an authorized code ci in order to access an entry (see Figure 6 ).
Authorized message
Authorized message Attacker Malicious message Attacker
Legitimate user
Step 2
Step 1 Objective Figure 6 . Schema of the attack. 1) Attacker intercepts an authorized message, 2) Attacker generates a malicious message using the information obtained in the previous step. Therefore, the attacker has to realize a double pre-image attack [25, 26] against two different hash algorithms.
Assuming that h and h are in line with the following statements:
• They're safe against pre-image attacks. A pre-image attack consists in finding a value a such as h(a) = b when b is known beforehand, and a hash function is considered safe against it if the probability of finding a value a that fits this condition is 1 2 n , where n is the length in bits of the output of h (so 2 n is the total amount of possible h outputs).
• The length of the output of h and h is n and m, respectively.
• The two algorithms are totally independent, so an attacker cannot obtain any information from either of them using the cryptanalysis of the other.
Thereby, the double pre-image attack consists in finding a c i such as h(c i ) = h(ci) and h (c i ) = h (ci). The probability of finding this value is 1 2 n · 1 2 m = 1 2 n+m , because both condition need to be met simultaneously.
If the attacker intercepts r different messages authorized to access the same entry, then the probability of a successful attack goes up to r · 1 2 n · 1 2 m = r Choosing two hash functions h y h whose output's size n and m are considered safe, and for which there are not any known algorithm that can reduce the complexity of a pre-image attack, then our system is safe against that kind of attack.
Security against update interception
In order to improve the operation of a Pro-active message's DTN, nodes spread routing information updates among the network during the update phase by sending pairs (j, E k j (Ij)) from the Entries Set to other nodes. This is a delicate situation, because an attacker that intercepts this transmission can obtain lots of entries of the ES.
The first thing the attacker has to do is to find the pair that contains the identifier j of the entry he wants to compromise. Next, the attack consists of breaking the ciphering provided by the symmetric key ciphering algorithm E, because there is no way to obtain the key kj, which is stored in the AHS and has not been transferred anywhere.
If the chosen E algorithm is safe, the probability of a successful attack is 1 2 n where n is the size of the key kj used to cipher the information (so the attack consists in trying with all possible combinations of n bits to find the key). Thereby, we can conclude that the system is safe against these kind of attacks and that nodes can send data from the ES without compromising the security of the network.
Compromising the node
This is the worst possible case. In this scenario, an attacker compromises the infrastructure of a node and wants to access all routing information of the RIDB. In this situation, the success of the attack is dependent upon acquiring Pro-active messages with authorization to access all the information. A situation like this is improbable and can compromise the security of any access control system.
The attacker tries to compromise all entries of ES using the data that can find in sets AHS and ES. The data from the AHS is not useful to the attacker unless he has intercepted some messages. When the attacker intercepts a message i with a routing code ci that is authorized to access Ij then this entry can be compromised. In that case, the attacker can use ci and the non-secret hash algorithms h and h to calculate h(ci) and h (ci) and access Ij using the algorithm explained in Section 5.
Although the system is not safe against an attack of this type, Identity based Access Control makes the success of the attack harder. Storing the information cyphered with a key that it is not present in the node forces the attacker to obtain the key using a different method, sniffing the network traffic or waiting until an authorized message arrives the node. Furthermore, nodes can easily spread updates of the routing information among the network safely, because an attacker that intercepts one or more of these updates cannot be able to decrypt it nor to access the needed keys. This contribution improves both the security of the network and the performance of its operation.
Even in the worst-case scenario attack, a compromised node where the attacker gains full control of the system, our proposal would make the success of the attack harder, and it would force the attacker to wait until the interception of some authorized messages before being able to access any cyphered information.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To test the feasibility of our proposal, and to evaluate its operation and its performance, we have tested Identity based Access Control on a specific application. In this section, we will present the chosen application and examine the most important implementation decisions taken during the development of a proof-of-concept software of our system. Finally, we will provide some conclusions obtained from the proof-of-concept.
Scenario of application: PROSES
The year 2020 will mark a turning point in the field of European air traffic management (ATM) and control, as the next evolution in ATM is expected to become fully operational and deployed. The Single European Sky (SES) initiative will unify the heterogeneous air traffic control models used by each country, transforming the European airspace into a single integrated air management scenario. In order to achieve this, the system will require an unprecedented level of connectivity between all the participants to support the massive increase in data exchanges taking place between the terrestrial, aerial and satellite platforms. In conclusion, a sort of "aerial ATM Internet" is being created, composed of mobile and collaborative nodes that will integrate distributed and/or geographically sparse services.
The scenario where we have tested and monitored our system is based on PROSES (PROtocols for the Single European Space) [27] . In PROSES, a network of 
Implementation decisions
In The most important modifications are:
• Change of approach: MobileC is no longer a mobile agent's platform, now is an element that can send, receive and route Pro-active messages with its own routing code.
• Implementation of a module that performs the neighbour discovery. This module is very necessary to use the platform in DTN environments where the neighbour's list of any node could change very quickly.
• Inclusion of the Identity based Access Control system presented in this paper, implemented using the algorithms described in Section 5.
The chosen hash and symmetric key cypher algorithm are: h = SHA2-256, h = SHA1, E = AES-256 CBC.
This choice was made taking into account that h and h must be independent algorithms. Besides, the size of the key of E and the output of h was considered in order to avoid having to truncate or pad these values. Notice that they're related because h(ci) is used as a key of algorithm E when cyphering and decrypting E h(c i ) (kj).
Implementation of the routing information
We have defined a collection of routing information related to different applications, which is a set of files with RDF statements. Each statement can be stored in an unprotected form, which means it is a public entry formatted as plain text, or can be protected by our system, which means that 
Test environment
The laboratory environment where we have tested our system is a machine with an Intel Pentium 4 3.3GHz
processor of 32 bits and 512MB of RAM memory and a GNU/Linux O.S. with a 3.3.2 kernel. The node is equipped with the Pro-active MobileC platform, and it is connected to a network interface through which it receives and sends Pro-active messages.
We have modelled the incoming traffic of Pro-active messages we injected in that node in the basis of the statistics exposed in the previous paragraph and information obtained in PROSES field tests. Figure 8 shows a schema of the operation of the test. Measurements allowed us to obtain average routing times and their corresponding standard deviations. We can evaluate the impact of our system by analysing the routing time taken by each message according to the size and the type of information accessed during routing.
Results
To obtain Figure 9 , we have grouped the samples according to the size and the type (cyphered or unencrypted) of the accessed information. We can observe how the overhead included by our access control system becomes linear as the size of the information increases. Also, we can see that the time needed for routing when the accessed entry is cyphered is slightly longer (6.67% in average) than when it is unencrypted. The obtained average routing times and its standard deviations for access to unencrypted information are shown in Table III . the size of PROSES' connectivity windows (10-30s), differences of 0.3s cannot be considered as significant, even if an increment of 0.3s represents a 120% growth in routing time (note that, in the same interval, the size of the entry has grown a 650%). Therefore, we can say our proposal is feasible, and its performance is good enough to be used in the studied DTN application, besides, as explained in Section 6, the usage of Identity based Access Control for Pro-active message's DTN would make the PROSES network safe against routing code forgery and update interception.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Most of DTN routing algorithms do not take into account the close relationship between applications and the way these use the network. DTN based on Pro-active messages solve that problem by allowing applications to define their own routing code and the information they need to consult during routing. This way, every application can chose differently the best way to get to its destination, and can even decide how to spread over the network creating copies of the messages. This is what we call "application driven routing".
In this paper, an access control system for routing information in a Pro-active message's based DTN has been presented. The fundamental contribution of this proposal lies in the usage of the own identity of the routing code that tries to access the information in order to decide if it is authorized. This system uses two different hash functions, one to identify the routing code that requests access to information, and the other to, together with a symmetric cyphering algorithm, protect the information and grant its confidentiality and integrity.
This proposal will not only improve security in Proactive messages based DTN, but also make the whole paradigm become feasible. Thanks to Identity based Access Control, an attacker will not be able to create a malicious message with a routing code that compromises the security of information stored in a node by poisoning it. Furthermore, nodes can spread updates of the routing information among the nodes of the network safely. In The application of our proposal in a specific context, PROSES, allowed us to evaluate the feasibility and the performance of the Identity based Access Control system.
In conclusion, the performance of the system is good enough to be used in the Pro-active message's DTN scenario.
We also studied the characteristics of our proposal and other access control systems in order to analyse if they can be applied to the environment of our research, Pro-active message's DTN. We found that only Identity based Access
Control system can be used properly in that environment due to its unique characteristics and design.
Future lines of research include, but are not limited to: widening the access control system to make it usable out of DTN scope; developing a mechanism to spread the information and enhance the operation of the network; and
improving the system to allow a posteriori modifications of the set of rules used to decide which codes are authorized or not to access information. It is also possible to use the same principles used here to control mobile agent's access to local resources in DTN scenarios.
